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The Fetu s as Parasite and Mushroom: 
Judith Jarvis Thomson's Defense of Abortion 
Gilbert Meilaender, Ph.D. 
A former assistant pastor of the Lutheran Church of the Messiah in 
Princeton, N.J., Dr. Meilaender is on the faculty of the department of 
religion at Oberlin College in Ohio. 
In an in teresting and widely read article , Judith Jarvis Thomson has 
provided a defense of abortion which claims not to rely on denying 
human status on the fetus-to-be-aborted.1 A great deal of the persuasive 
force of her argument depends, I am inclined to think, on the force of 
two analogies she uses in the course of her paper. My purpose is to 
reflect on these analogies and to suggest that they are very strange 
indeed. The first of Thomson's analogies reflects an excessively indi-
vidualistic notion of human personhood, a notion oblivious to the 
bonds which tie us to one another. The second expresses (but does not 
reflect upon) a person-body dualism. Together these analogies subtly 
distort the matter under discussion and manifest an insensitivity to the 
human character of birth and motherhood. 
It is not my intent to argue here that all abortion is wrong nor even 
to provide the beginnings of an argument to that effect .2 I will also 
not try to settle the difficult question of the point in time at which we 
have among us a new life, a new individual human being. These are 
important questions and necessary for any full-fledged treatment of 
abortion. They are not, however, my primary concern here. It is 
Thomson's images, not her arguments, upon which I focus. 
Thomson herself grants for the sake of argument that the fetus is a 
person from the moment of conception (p . 48). Her concern is to 
suggest that opponents of abortion have tended to assume that, once 
this was established, the argument against abortion was finished. She, 
on the contrary, is puzzled about the move from an affirmation of the 
personhood of the fetus to the conclusion that the fetus can claim 
rights against the mother or that abortion is morally permissible. She 
thinks that opponents of abortion pass over this problem much too 
quickly (p. 48). In this she may well be correct, though it is worth 
noting even here that there is something a little strange about her case. 
If the fetus is a person - which we are granting for the sake of the 
discussion - then surely the burden of proof is on the side of those 
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who deny that rights may properly be ascribed to it or who advocate 
taking its life. Thomson talks as if there is something unusual about 
this, whereas I should think it rather clear. It is not at all surprising 
that opponents of abortion should have assumed that persons have 
rights (and, most basically, a right to life), nor that they should have 
called upon others to protect these rights. It is not surprising that 
opponents of abortion should have confined their efforts largely to 
discussing when human life begins and to criticizing various proposed 
defenses of aborting such lives. To do that, of course, even to do it 
successfully, is not to show that no such defense is possible. But it is a 
perfectly understandable procedure if one assumes that - in the 
absence of forceful arguments to the contrary - one human life (even 
that of the fetus) is entitled to as much protection as another. The 
fact that Thomson seems to distribute the burden of proof wrongly 
from the outset is itself cause for wonder. 
The Fetus as Parasite 
Suppose we grant that the fetus is a person, how then might we 
argue that abortion is, nevertheless, morally permissible? Thomson 
suggests that the mother's right to decide what happens to her body is 
stronger than the fetus' right to life - or, at least, that the mother is 
under no obligation to permit the fetus to continue to grow within her 
body. She grants, of course, that in some instances it would be mor-
ally reprehensible for the mother to abort the fetus. She speaks of 
Good Samaritans, Splendid Samaritans, etc. But these do more than 
their duty. There is in no case an obligation not to abort or a justified 
rights-claim on the part of the fetus. At this point we may consider 
her first analogy : that of the unconscious violinist. 
You are asked to suppose this case: There is a famous violinist 
t· suffering from a fatal kidney ailment, and you alone have the right 
type of blood to help him. One night the Society of Music Lovers 
kidnaps you and plugs the violinist 's circulatory system into yours. In 
this way the violinist can (for the amount of time needed to save his 
life) live off your system. Your kidneys can be used to extract poisons 
from his system as well as from yours. You wake up in the morning 
I ) and find yourself in bed with the unconscious violinist, his system 
plugged into yours. And the question is whether it would be morally 
wrong for you or anyone else to unplug you, even though such action 
would certainly mean the death of the violinist. 
The force of the analogy is to present the opponent of abortion 
with a dilemma. If he says, "Once there is (innocent) life we should 
not directly take it," he seems committed to leaving himself plugged 
into the violinist for as long as necessary. If, on the other hand, he 
claims that the cases are markedly dissimilar in that he did not volun-
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tarily consent to be plugged into the violinist, his case against abortion 
in certain kinds of situations (e.g., cases of rape) seems to collapse. 
The one good thing I can think of to say for the analogy and the 
dilemma Thomson generates on the basis of it, is that it may help us 
to see why abortion in cases of rape is a very special and different 
matter. However, I am not certain Thomson always sees why this is so. 
She seems to think that rape is an exception just as a pregnancy which 
requires the mother to spend nine months in bed is an exception (pp. 
49f.). The fact that she can run together pregnancy resulting from 
forcible intercourse with other cases is nothing short of remarkable. 
This shows that rape is an exception in her thinking only because it 
seems to impose a special burden for which the mother did not vol-
unteer. 
Thomson seems oblivious to what is surely more important than the 
fact that the mother did not "invite" this fetus in - namely, the 
nature of the relationship in which the fetus was conceived, a relation-
ship which strikes many of us as not only less than human but 
inhuman. This same blind spot is manifested later in the paper when 
Thomson suggests that a woman who became pregnant as a result of 
rape ought to carry the child to term if the pregnancy lasted only an 
hour (p. 60). In that case, the implication seems to be, the burden 
(though not volunteered for) would not be great enough to justify a 
refusal. Yet, even in such a case the relationship in which the fetus had 
been conceived would be one repugnant to our sense of humanity. 
The woman's body would have been forcibly used as a means for 
someone else's pleasure in a relationship devoid of genuine giving and 
receiving. Unless we think persons are not present in their bodies (as, 
we shall see, there is some reason to believe Thomson thinks), this 
means that not only the woman's body but her person has been used 
in an inhuman manner. One would, however, never guess any of this 
from Thomson's argument. 
More important than this, however, is the way the analogy forces 
one to picture the fetus: as parasite. And, of course, there is no doubt 
that the fetus does for nine months live off the mother and make use 
of the mother's circulatory and waste disposal systems. But shall we 
acquiesce in this picture of the fetus as parasite? Or shall we suggest 
that it subtly distorts the entire discussion? The latter seems to be the 
case. 
Striking Act of Creativity 
There is, in the conception and growth of the fetus in its mother's 
womb, a striking act of creativity. This very same act witnesses as well 
to the self-spending which such creativity requires. That for nine 
months the child lives within (and, indeed, off) the mother provides a 
paradigm of human dependence and, we might also say, vicariousness. 
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There is no human being who has not been so bound to others from 
the moment of his birth. For Thomson this is just so much biology, 
the relationship between mother and child being merely a biological 
one with no special human significance (p. 65). Human significance 
seems in her account to enter only when an act of will takes place, 
when the parent recognizes or acknowledges the child and thereby 
takes responsibility for it. Whatever it is that characterizes our human-
ity evidently has more relation to seeing ourselves as "isolated prin-
ciples of will" 3 than embodied creatures. 
And yet, it is not impossible to think differently about the fact that 
the fetus lives off its mother. We may see there a sign of what is truly 
human: an inescapable witness to the self-spending which human life 
requires and to the bonds of vicarious dependence which encompasses 
the lives of us all. We may see there a sign - indeed, more than that, 
an embodiment - of the fact that we do live off others who never 
invited us to do so or granted us any rights thereto. And we may even 
find there an invitation to recognize that we cannot, without forfeit-
ing our humanity , turn from the giving which is the other side of that 
receiving. 
The first thing we notice, therefore, when we begin with Thomson 
to picture the fetus as parasite is the striking individualistic bias of this 
viewpoint. Vicariousness is to her simply a burden, not an essential 
part of creative human love. Perhaps then we ought to examine this 
picture of the fetus as parasite. The womb is the natural environment 
of the fetus. We expect to find it there. We expect to find it nourished 
by and living off the mother. We expect, in short, that it will be 
dependent in this way. Yet, if we want to claim that there is moral 
significance to be discerned here - that here we may learn something 
about the proper shape of human life - we will have to say more than 
this. For could we not say much the same of any parasite that lives 
off its host? Is not the host its natural environment? Do we not expect 
to find the parasite dependent in this way? Will we not find both fetus 
living off mother and parasite living off host in nature? Why, then, 
should the cases be different? 
"For most creatures," Annie Dillard writes, "being parasitized is a 
way of life."4 We could, she suggests, write a " lives of the parasites" 
which would be a kind of "hellish hagiography," the devil's summa 
theologica.5 Parasitism may, though I think it ought not, be defined 
simply in terms of dependency. On this sort of definition "the essen-
tial criterion of parasitism is dependency, the loss of freedom to live 
an independent existence ... . "6 Such a definition may be too broad, 
however, since it might with some justification be taken to apply to 
almost anything in nature understood as an interconnected system. It 
is perhaps better to define parasitism more narrowly as ~'a type of 
symbiosis in which two different kinds of organism habitually asso-
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ciate with one another, to the detriment of one and the benefit of the 
other. "7 Annie Dillard's book is a gold mine of hair-raising descrip-
tions of parasitism, if one is interested in examples. 
There is an insect order that consists entirely of parasitic insects called, 
singly and collectively, stylops, which is interest ing because of the gro-
tesquerie of its form and its effects. Sty lops parasitize diverse other insects 
such as leaf hoppers, ants, bees, and wasps. The female spends her ent ire life 
inside the body of her host, with only the tip of her bean-shaped body 
protruding. She is a formless lump, having no wings , legs, eyes, or antennae; 
her vestigial mouth and anus are tiny , degenerate, and nonfunctional. She 
absorbs food - her host - through the skin of her abdomen, which is "in-
flated , white, and soft." 8 
Considering this and other like "natural" phenomenona she is 
moved to ask: "Are my values then so diametrically opposed to those 
that nature preserves?" and "Is human culture with its values my only 
real home after all?" 9 
Perhaps the fetus in the mother's womb is just one more example of 
such parasitism. Why should we not picture it that way? The first 
thing which needs to be said is that we certainly can picture it that 
way. The second is that we need not do so. Nature provides us with 
countless examples of dependence. But nature's book must be read. 
It is possible to think that some examples of dependence which 
nature presents us are corruptions or perversions of a principle which 
is rightly exemplified in others. Thus, the fact that the fetus lives off 
the mother while in her womb may be of enormous human signifi-
cance and tell us much about what is appropriate to our natures. We 
may say with Marcel that "a family is not created or maintained as an 
entity without the exercise of a fundamental generosity." 10 The fact 
that the parasite lives off the host demonstrates only that the principle 
of vicariousness can be distorted. Such an insight lay behind St. 
Augustine's privative theory of evil. When he says that evil has no 
independent existence and that it can exist only as a corruption of 
what is good, he is both giving us a reading of nature's book and 
asserting the priority of goodness. 11 
Different Phenomena 
From this perspective, while granting that the fetus is in some t. 
respects like a parasite, we may come to see that the two are never-
theless quite different phenomena. They are ordered toward different 
ends . The analogy of the fetus as parasite fails to take note of the fact 
that parasitism is not a method of procreation. Creatures which are 
parasites have other - sometimes asexual - means of reproduction. 
To construct an analogy which invites us to picture the fetus as a 
parasite is, therefore , to misplace the phenomenon. Parasitism is dif-
ferent from procreation of one's kind. Furthermore, the fetus in the 
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womb is moving toward a stage when it will attain a kind of inde-
pendence relative to its earlier condition. But parasitism, on the other 
hand, "involves a gradual and progressive adaptation on the part of the 
parasite, and recovery of an independent status becomes increasingly 
difficult." 12 We may recall the stylops. The vicariousness of which the 
fetus provides a paradigm is strikingly creative - oriented not toward 
degenerative dependence but toward new life which will be able to 
give as it has received. Rightly ordered, vicariousness is meant to be 
creative and life-giving. 
I have put the point in Augustinian terms. Augustine's belief, of 
course, had some theological roots. He knew and believed a story 
which spoke of nature as a good thing now corrupted. It gave him 
warrant, therefore, to expect that he might find in nature a relation-
ship which could be exemplified in both good and bad ways . But we 
can put the matter in slightly less theological terms. That the parasite 
lives off its host and the child off its mother are both natural in the 
sense that observation and inspection find both in nature. But in that 
sense, of course, nothing can be unnatural; whatever upon inspection 
we find simply is exhibited as part of nature, and corruption cannot 
exist. However, when we read nature's book, it is possible to say that 
some acts or conditions exemplify vicariousness in its natural - i.e., 
rightly ordered - state. Some sorts of dependence are appropriate to 
the sorts of creatures we are, even as some are corruptions of our 
nature. 
We acknowledge this to be the case when we say that the womb of 
the mother is the natural environment of the fetus . It is quite appro-
priate for our natures that we should find the fetus there. Indeed, we 
think it of great human significance. Now, how one proves to the 
skeptic that it is of great significance I am not at all sure. It is always 
possible to refuse to distinguish one example of vicariousness from 
another. It is possible to 'grant no significance to the fact that the 
dependence of the fetus is part of a creative act oriented toward new 
life. We certainly can think of individuals as isolated and refuse to 
grant that creation of new life has its origin in an act of self-spending 
which ought to be pronounced good. Therefore, I am uncertain how, 
in any strong sense, to prove what I have argued for. And yet, to think 
, ) that it needs to be proven is already to imagine we can think of human 
beings in isolation, apart from this relationship of vicarious depend-
ence. It is, in short, to imagine that we can think of them as other 
than human .. We cannot, of course, prevent Thomson from adopting 
an angle of vision which pictures the fetus as if it were a parasite. But 
when she does thiS she is no longer discussing anything which we 
understand to be a human being. Hence, her analogy is subtly distort-
ing. We cannot heed both it and her prior affirmation that she will 
grant from the outset that the fetus is a human being. The analogy 
May, 1979 131 
asks us to picture the fetus as a parasite, and, though we can do that, 
we cannot do it while simultaneously thinking of the fetus as a human 
being. 
When we see the parasite living off its host, we see a corrupt imita-
tion of something which in itself exhibits right order; namely, the 
dependence of the fetus on its mother and the vicarious character of 
human life to which it witnesses. That we should find both in a world 
in which, as Augustine put it, pride perversely copies the work of love, 
need not particularly surprise us. Thomson's picture of the fetus as 
parasite misses the human significance of vicarious dependence within 
love - and in so doing betrays the striking individualistic bias of her 
argument. 
The Fetus as Mushroom 
There is a later stage in Thomson's argument which also needs 
examination. In the course of broadening her defense of abortion to 
include within its scope many cases in which the mother willingly and 
knowingly risked pregnancy, she provides us with a new analogy. We 
are asked now to suppose that 
people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your win-
dows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You 
don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, 
the very best you can buy_ As can happen, however , and on very, very rare 
occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in 
and takes root (p. 59). 
I label this picture "the fetus as mushroom" as a way of recalling that 
imagery is scarcely original with Thomson. In his De Cive, Thomas 
Hobbes suggests that we "consider men as if but even now sprung out 
of the earth , and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, 
without all kind of engagement to each other." 13 Part of the point of 
the analogy is to suggest that parents mayor may not, as they wish, 
take responsibility for children resulting from contraceptive failure. 
However, if the opponent of abortion must wriggle a bit when claim-
ing that cases of pregnancy resulting from rape differ in no special way 
from other pregnancies, surely we ought to wonder at least as much 
about an argument which suggests that pregnancy resulting from con- l 
traceptive failure is involuntary in a way similar to pregnancy resulting 
from rape. Thomson's position comes close to saying that we are 
responsible for no consequences of our actions except those we 
wanted to occur. 
Of more concern is the fact that this analogy once again invites us 
to picture the fetus in a way which fails to capture the human sig-
nificance of birth and motherhood. Parenthood is, of course, more 
than begetting, but it is not less. Near the end of her article Thomson 
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considers the possibility that someone might say (as indeed I am say-
ing) that her analogies are irrelevant because they miss the fact of the 
special relationship between fetus and mother. In reply she refers us 
back to the section of her paper in which she has provided the 
"people-seed" analogy, hardly an adequate response. Then she offers a 
brief recapitulation of her view. It is, in effect, that we have no special 
responsibilities toward anyone unless we assume and acknowledge 
them. Until such time as parents "give" the child rights by accepting 
responsibility for it, the child has none. 
A number of difficulties arise. Thomson has granted for the sake of 
argument that the fetus is a person. Can we have a person who is not 
the bearer of (at least some) rights? That is a rather strange concept of 
personhood. It is difficult to know how, in the course of an argument 
which purports to grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of 
conception, Thomson can imagine that it has no rights unless they are 
conferred. In fact, here she seems to draw a different line for the 
beginning of personhood - a line grounded in the parents' taking the 
child home and assuming responsibility for it. But, passing by that 
difficulty, why does Thomson think it so evident that, if the parents 
do this, they have granted the child rights or accepted obligations? At 
some future time when the child becomes especially burdensome (and 
they only become more burdensome post-partum, as any parent 
knows!) what is to prevent the parents from maintaining that their 
acts did not involve the taking on of such obligations? Thomson's 
argument evidently will have to involve some kind of tacit consent, 
though she does not say so. But why should any kind of consent bind 
forever? Where will Thomson get her principle of fidelity? It is doubt-
ful whether, from her premises, it can be gotten at all. At the very 
least, we can say that she has failed to argue for it. 
Forgetting these difficulties, however, I am most interested in the 
vision of the fetus as mushroom which the analogy invites us to adopt. 
In some ways, Thomson's analogies - the images she adopts - may be 
more important than her arguments. When the fetus is pictured as 
mushroom, the biological relationship between mother (or parents) 
and child is of no special significance. It does not involve us personally 
in any important way, and we are essentially individuals isolated from 
, ) one another. This is, I think, just one example of the very dis-
embodied concept of a person which floats around Thomson's essay. 
There are strange dualisms scattered around it, not least of which is 
the talk about the mother's body as a house which she owns. Indeed, 
we might say that here the analogies merge. Individualism and dualism 
feed one another as the fetus is conceived of both as parasite and 
mushroom. 
Had Shakespeare known what Thomson knows we might have been 
bereft of some immortal lines. For, when Romeo creeps into Juliet's 
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courtyard and she comes onto the balcony, Shakespeare places into 
Juliet 's mouth the philosophy of Thomson and Hobbes : 
° Romeo , Romeo! Wherefore art thou Romeo? 
Deny thy fath er and refuse thy nam e ! 
Of if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love , 
and I'll no longer be a Capulet. 
'Tis but thy nam e that is my enemy . 
. . . 0 , be some other name ! 14 
But, of course, Shakespeare knows - and we are to know - full 
well that this philosophy is false. Juliet would have us pretend that we 
are "even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms 
come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other." 
It is not surprising that the story of one who believes that should be a 
tragedy. Romeo is a Montague and Juliet a Capulet. But is that not 
mere biology? Evidently not; for mere biology does not seem to have 
a part in the play. Romeo can no more deny his father or his name 
than Juliet can cease to be a Capulet. The name of each helps to fix 
their respective personal histories. 
Thomson's picture of the fetus as mushroom would deny human, 
personal significance to a biological relationship which marks each of 
us. And here again we encounter the same problem in trying to adopt 
Thomson's angle of vision. We can think of creatures like these mush-
rooms which her analogy suggests. But we cannot think of them in the 
terms her argument purports to grant: as human beings. For she has 
abstracted them from one of the relationships which importantly char-
acterize our humanity. 
Conclusion 
My purpose in this paper can, on the one hand, be construed very 
modestly indeed. I have merely tried to explain why it is that Thom-
son's defense of abortion appears to distort the issue almost beyond 
recognition. But, of course, the issues raised are really far from 
modest, and they involve questions beyond the scope of any single 
essay. 
The burden of my concern is to ask, how are we to discuss this 
issue? Thomson does not seem to me to discuss it in the terms she says 
she will grant. One does not know how she pictures a human being or 
what she thinks a person is. At times it seems that one cannot be a 
person unless some other person (how identified?) confers that status 
upon him, at least tacitly . At other times it seems that a person is a 
kind of disembodied, volitional agent. To subscribe to either of these 
views is, I think, mistaken. But, then, how shall we discuss abortion? 
What shall we take Thomson to mean when she says she will assume 
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that the fetus is a person? Her analogies seem to suggest that persons 
are, in important ways, like parasites and mushrooms. Evidently she 
thinks it illuminating to conceive of human beings in that way. I 
confess that I do not. I emphasize once again that I have not tried to 
determine which, if any, abortions are morally permissible, nor have I 
tried to define when the fetus becomes a human being. I have only 
tried to suggest why, from at least certain perspectives , Thomson 's 
argument must appear to be a sham, denying in its content what it 
purports to grant in its initial assumption and, thereby, subtly leading 
the discussion astray. 15 
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